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Social Preferences in Experimental
Economics
James Woodward†‡
This article explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from
one-shot games to reach conclusions about the existence of social preferences that are
taken to figure in the explanation of cooperation in repeated interactions in real life.
1. Introduction. In recent years, results from laboratory experiments in
economics have been used to support the conclusion that human beings
possess so-called social (non-self-interested or other-regarding) preferences
and that such preferences play an important role in explaining cooperative
behavior outside of the laboratory. This use of experiments raises a num-
ber of interesting methodological issues; in this article, my primary focus
will be on just one of them—the use of results from one-shot or nonrepeated
games to detect or “measure” social preferences that are claimed to be at
work in real life cooperative activities outside the laboratory that involve
repeated interactions.
My discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews a few
of the relevant experimental results. Section 3 introduces some terminol-
ogy and the distinction between using laboratory evidence to test the
hypothesis that people are entirely self-interested and using laboratory
evidence to measure social preferences that are also at work outside of
the laboratory. Section 4 then discusses arguments for and against the use
of one-shot laboratory games to measure social preferences
2. Some Experimental Results. In an ordinary ultimatum game (UG), a
proposer (P) proposes a division of a monetary stake of $n to a responder,
R.1 P may allocate any amount $x up to $n for himself, with the remainder
†To contact the author, please write to: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences,
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; e-mail: jfw@hss.caltech.edu.
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1. For more detailed discussion of these and many other results, see Camerer (2003).
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going to R. If R accepts this allocation, both players get the$n x
proposed division. If R rejects, both players get nothing. The identities
of both P and R are unknown to one another. Suppose that the game is
one-shot and that both players have entirely selfish preferences. Then R
will prefer any positive offer to an offer of zero. If P knows this, P will
offer R the smallest possible positive amount of money (e.g., one cent if
the stake is divisible down to pennies) and R will accept: this is the
subgame perfect equilibrium. This is not what is observed experimentally
in any population. In most populations in developed countries, Ps offer
an average of 0.3–0.4 of the total stake and offers under 0.2 are rejected
half the time. The modal offer is 0.5.
In a public goods (PG) game, each of N players can contribute an
amount ci of their choosing from an initial endowment that is the same
for each player. The total amount contributed by all players is mul-Sci
tiplied by some factor and divided equally among all of them(m ! 1/N )
players, regardless of how much they contribute. In other words, each
player i’s endowment is changed by In this game, if playersc mSc .i i
care only about their own monetary pay-offs, the dominant strategy is
to contribute nothing—that is, to free ride on the contributions of the
other players. In one-shot PG games in developed countries in which
subjects do not know one another’s identities, they contribute on average
about half of their endowment, although again there is a great deal of
variation, with a number of subjects contributing nothing and others
contributing everything.
In repeated PG games, subjects begin with a substantial mean contri-
bution, which then significantly declines under repetition. If a costly pun-
ishment option is introduced that allows subjects to punish noncontri-
butors but at a cost to themselves, a number will do so, even in the final
round, in which punishment cannot influence future behavior. Introduc-
tion of this option prevents the decline in contributions with repeated
play.
In the experimental results described so far, subjects were drawn from
“developed” countries (United States, Europe, etc.) and there was con-
siderable uniformity of behavior. However, in a fascinating series of cross-
cultural experiments (described in Henrich 2004) in which such games
were played in a number of different small-scale societies in Asia, Africa,
and South America, there was considerably more variation in results. For
example, among the Machiguenga in Peru, one-shot UG offers had a
mean of 0.26 and a mode of 0.15 (far lower than the mean and modal
offers in developed societies) and almost no offers were rejected. In con-
trast, among the Lamerela in Indonesia, offers in excess of 0.50 (hyper-
fair offers ) were common and there was frequent rejection, even of hyper-
fair offers. A similar variation was found in PG games and trust games.
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Moreover, in at least some cases, these results appear to correlate with
features of social life in the societies in question. For example, the Ma-
chiguenga are described as “socially disconnected” by anthropologists,
with economic life centering on the individual family and little opportunity
for anonymous transactions. By contrast, the Lamerala are a whaling
society, in which there is a high degree of cooperative hunting and food
sharing and in which it is common for people to reject gifts out of concern
that this will place them under an obligation to reciprocate. The Orma
in Kenya make relatively high contributions in PG games (both in com-
parison to many other small-scale societies and the contemporary United
States: 0.58 of their endowments). Participants in this game associated it
with a harambee, “a Swahili word for the institution of village level con-
tributions for PG projects such as building a school” (Ensminger 2004,
376), and in fact a harambee collection was going on at the time the PG
game was played. Ensminger suggests that the relatively high level of
contribution was at least in part a reflection of the willingness of the
participants to think of it as an instance of this practice.
3. Social Preferences? What do these results show about the existence of
“social preferences”? Before exploring this question, some distinctions and
regimentation of language will be helpful. I will assume that to talk to
preferences of any kind, whether selfish or not, these must be both well
behaved—in the sense of satisfying the usual axioms of revealed preference
theory—and at least somewhat stable or robust in the sense of holding
across some nontrivial range of contexts and changes in background con-
ditions. I will say that subjects have entirely self-interested preferences if
and only if (iff) they always choose in such a way as to maximize their
own (expected) monetary payoffs. Subjects exhibit non–self-interested or
“prosocial” behavior iff they do not always make choices that maximize
their own expected monetary payoffs. Prosocial behavior thus includes
both cases in which subjects make choices that increase monetary pay-
offs to others at the cost of a reduction of their own monetary pay-offs
and cases in which subjects are willing to reduce their own monetary pay-
offs in order to impose costs on others (cases in which subjects exhibit
negative reciprocity). Subjects have social preferences iff they exhibit pro-
social behavior and what is responsible for this behavior has the structure
of a preference—that is, it is well behaved and at least somewhat stable.
In thinking about the results from the experiments described above, it
also will be useful to distinguish two projects or sets of issues. The first
(P1) has to do with using the experiments to test the hypothesis S that
the subject’s preferences are entirely self-interested. The second issue (P2)
is this: If, as many investigators believe, S can be rejected, can we then
use the behavior exhibited in these games to reliably measure or estimate
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the subject’s social preferences and then use this information to explain
their behavior in other real life contexts? One way in which P1 and P2
differ is that an affirmative answer to P2 requires that the behavior and
preferences present in the laboratory games exhibit some nontrivial degree
of stability or robustness: it must be possible to detect or measure pref-
erences in laboratory contexts and then generalize or export this infor-
mation to other contexts, including real life field contexts under conditions
that differ from those in the laboratory. It might be reasonable to reject
S even if these assumptions about robustness are not true. That is, in
principle at least, the subject’s behavior in the laboratory or elsewhere
might be prosocial or not fully explainable in terms of self-interested
preferences and yet it might also be true that the additional influences on
their behavior (whatever we decide to call these) are highly nonrobust
and context dependent, in which case the measurement project (and per-
haps even talk of “social preferences”) might not be well motivated. In
this connection, both fans and critics of the notion of social preferences
have tended to assume that the notion of a social preference requires that
there be at least some consistency of type at the individual level with, say,
individuals who have a taste for negative reciprocity in some contexts
(e.g. an ultimatum game of a certain design) also exhibiting this taste in
other contexts as well—for example, in a willingness to punish noncon-
tributors in PG games or in a willingness to reject low offers in a real life
wage negotiation. I will follow this usage below.2
4. Social Preferences and Repeated Games. Why might one think that the
experimental results described in Section 2 fail to show that subjects ex-
hibit non-self-interested behavior and/or have social preferences? One rel-
evant set of considerations derives from the theory of repeated games.
Suppose that we are dealing with subjects whose preferences are entirely
self-interested. Assume also that interactions are two–person or bilateral
and that, in particular, two players find themselves in a game (like an
ultimatum game [UG] or a prisoner’s dilemma [PD]) that has the structure
of a “social dilemma”: there are gains for both players (in comparison
to the baseline outcome in which each chooses a noncooperative strategy)
2. Although space precludes detailed discussion, let me note that there is little positive
evidence for such consistency or stability and that there is at least some evidence against
it. Experimentation shows that behavior (and presumably whatever preferences underlie
such behavior) in many of the games described above is influenced in highly nonsys-
tematic ways by a variety of different conditions—informational or anonymity con-
ditions, framing, available alternatives, etc. See Camerer 2003 and Woodward, forth-
coming, for additional discussion. The issue of consistency of subject’s behavior/
preferences across games and between games and real life behavior remains surprisingly
unexplored.
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that can be obtained from mutual choice of cooperative strategies but
that a noncooperative choice is individually rational for each if they in-
teract only once. Assume, however, that their interaction is repeated—in
particular, that it has the structure of a repeated two-person game of
indefinite length and that certain other conditions are met—the players
care about their future sufficiently (do not discount too heavily) and have
accurate information about the choices of the other player. Then, for
many games meeting these conditions, the mutual choice of a cooperative
strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. To take what is
perhaps the best known example, mutual choice of tit-for-tat is a Nash
equilibrium of a repeated PD of indefinite length, assuming that the play-
ers have sufficiently high discount rates and accurate information about
one another’s play. What this shows (it is claimed) is that one can explain
cooperative behavior in repeated games (to the extent that it occurs)
simply by assuming that the players have self-interested preferences; at
least in these contexts, the assumption that players have social preferences
is unnecessary and hence unwarranted.
In my view there are a number of reasons for doubting that this analysis
provides a full explanation for cooperative behavior even in repeated
games, but in what follows I want to put this issue aside and assume, as
many researchers do, that the analysis does show that cooperative be-
havior in repeated games can be accounted for just in terms of selfish
preferences. In particular, I want to explore a line of argument, due to
Ken Binmore (see, e.g., Binmore 2005, 2007) and Larry Samuelson (2005),
among others, that uses this analysis of repeated games to criticize the
use of evidence from one-shot games to measure social preferences.
Very roughly, the Binmore/Samuelson critique runs as follows. They
begin with the claim that all or most real life social interaction is best
modeled as a repeated game and that most subjects have very little ex-
perience with the sorts of anonymous one-shot games that are played in
laboratory experiments. This is particularly likely to be true in the small
groups or small-scale societies in which human beings lived for most of
their history—experience of which presumably played an important role
in shaping whatever dispositions to cooperate we presently possess. In
such societies, and even in contemporary industrialized societies, most
people find themselves repeatedly interacting with the same individuals
in contexts in which questions of cooperation arise. Call this the frequency
of repetition claim. Binmore and Samuelson suggest that, in consequence,
when subjects play a one-shot game in the laboratory, one of two (not
mutually exclusive) things is likely to happen. On the one hand, subjects
may simply be confused, not really understanding the structure of the
game being played and the real consequences of their choices. Alterna-
tively, subjects may play the laboratory game by importing (perhaps con-
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sciously, perhaps tacitly3) patterns of behavior, heuristics, or norms that
derive from their experience in playing some repeated game in real life
that strikes them as similar to the laboratory game, as the participants
in Ensminger’s experiments apparently did. Call this the importation thesis.
(If the importation thesis seems far-fetched, note that it seems to provide
a fairly accurate description of the relationship between many of the
experiments reported in the Henrich et al. [2004] anthropological study
and real life behavior.)
In either case, Binmore and Samuelson claim that problems result for
the whole project of using one-shot games to measure social preferences.
If subjects are confused, they may not have well-defined preferences (or
be maximizing a well-defined utility function) at all. If subjects import
patterns of behavior from a repeated game, then they are not playing the
one-shot game that the experimentalist assumes that they are playing and
inferences about their preferences based on that assumption will be invalid.
As a simple illustration of this second possibility, suppose that subjects
are presented with a one-shot game in which monetary payoffs to each
player (not necessarily their utilities) have the structure of a PD. Suppose
that the subjects cooperate. One explanation is that the subjects have
social preferences that make cooperation an optimal strategy for each—
they care about the payoffs to the other player as well as their own and
act so as to maximize their expected utility. However, another possibility
is that the subjects tacitly model the one-shot PD as a repeated game and
import strategies like tit-for-tat that are equilibrium strategies for subjects
with selfish preferences in the repeated game into the one-shot laboratory
game. If subjects do this, we apparently can explain their behavior without
any appeal to other-regarding social preferences. A similar observation
applies to other one-shot games that are often taken to show the existence
of social preferences.
Defenders of the use of one-shot games to argue for the existence of
social preferences, such as Camerer and Fehr (2004) and Gintis (2006),
have responded to this critique by criticizing both the frequency thesis
and the importation thesis. In connection with the former, it is suggested
(I believe plausibly) that, at least in societies like ours and perhaps more
generally, real life one-shot interactions are actually fairly common and
3. Experimenters go to considerable lengths to make sure that subjects understand (at
a conscious level) the rules of the game that they are playing, including whether it is
one-shot or repeated. What Binmore and Samuelson are suggesting is that, despite
their intellectual recognition that the game is one-shot, subjects may nonetheless import
(perhaps as a result of unconscious processing or implicit learning) patterns of play
from repeated games with which they have experience.
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frequently involve cooperation.4 For example, situations in which people
face decisions about whether to tip in restaurants to which they will not
return seem fairly common in societies like ours. Moreover, many people
seem to act in a way that does not maximize their material pay-offs in
such situations. If so, such behavior cannot be explained in terms of the
importation of patterns of play that are sustained by self-interested pref-
erences in repeated games. However, as we shall see, despite the rhetorical
role played by the frequency claim in Binmore’s and Samuelson’s dis-
cussion, many of their methodological worries about the use of one-shot
games to explain real life cooperation seem largely independent of whether
the frequency claim is correct.
A second line of response to the Binmore-Samuelson argument criticizes
the importation thesis, or at least the strong form of it that seems to be
required by their argument. According to this strong form of the thesis,
subjects always and automatically transfer strategies appropriate for some
repeated game they have experienced in “real life” into one-shot games
in a behaviorally inflexible way—that is, they always play one-shot games
as though they are such repeated games or fail to distinguish between
one-shot and repeated versions of the same game. Defenders of the use
of one-shot games to measure social preferences contend that this version
of the importation thesis is inconsistent with a substantial amount of
behavioral evidence suggesting that even naive subjects play differently
in repeated and one-shot games of the same type and that they modify
their behavior in the latter depending on the play of their opponents and
on considerations having to do with reputation formation. For example,
Fehr and Fischbacher (2003; also discussed in Camerer and Fehr 2004)
conducted a series of UGs in two different conditions, each involving
subjects playing a different opponent in each of 10 different iterations.
4. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, it is worth observing that there is an ambiguity
in the notion of a one-shot or nonrepeated game that has been a potential source of
confusion in this discussion. On the one hand, this may be a game that a subject plays
only once (ever, with any one). Such games may well be uncommon in our or any
other society, and since subjects have no prior experience with them, it is not implausible
that they often may play in a “confused” way—certainly play will not be governed by
preexisting norms or patterns of behavior with which the subjects are familiar. On the
other hand, a “one-shot” game may be a game that is played repeatedly by a subject
but always with different people—as when the same person makes a series of decisions
on different evenings about whether to tip in different restaurants or when a merchant
makes a series of decisions about whether to cheat different customers. It seems to me
that, in societies like ours, people often will have repeated experience with interactions
that are one-shot in this second sense, and, of course, there often will be norms,
expectations, or repeated patterns governing such interactions—e.g., norms about tip-
ping. To the extent that this is so, the claim that behavior in such interactions reflects
confusion or unfamiliarity will be less plausible.
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In one condition, proposers knew nothing about the past play of re-
sponders so that responders had no opportunity to build a reputation by
rejecting low offers. In the reputation condition, proposers knew about
the past play of responders. It was found that the great majority of re-
sponders increase their threshold for the lowest offers they will accept in
the reputation condition as opposed to the no-reputation condition. This
suggests that they understood the value of reputation formation and,
along with it, the contrast between one-shot and repeated play (Camerer
and Fehr 2004). There are many other experiments pointing to a similar
conclusion. For example, subjects play repeated PDs with the same op-
ponent differently from one-shot PDs—they cooperate more when they
play against the same opponent, and they play repeated one-shot PDs
(i.e., PDs played against a different opponent each time) differently than
PDs that they play only once—cooperation declines over time in repeated
one-shot play. Again, this seems to suggest that subjects are sensitive to
the strategic and reputational considerations that distinguish repeated
from one-shot play and are influenced by learning from previous play.
Although this response to the importation thesis has been advanced in
support of the claim that one-shot games can be used to detect or measure
social preferences, it seems to me that, to the extent that the response is
correct, it undermines or at least casts doubt on that claim. The essential
problem can be put in the form of a dilemma. Suppose that our interest
is in using a one-shot laboratory game in which subjects cooperate (e.g.,
a one-shot PG game) to understand why subjects also cooperate in a real
life repeated interaction, such as the harambee institution. Logically, there
seem to be just two possibilities. One is that, as Binmore and Samuelson
suggest, subjects import patterns of behavior that are appropriate in the
real life repeated game into the lab game. Then, to the extent that purely
selfish preferences are sufficient to explain cooperation in the real life
repeated game, it would appear, for reasons we have discussed, that no
inference to the existence of social (nonselfish) preferences on the basis
of performance in the laboratory game is warranted. That is, if subjects
play one-shot games by importing, as Binmore and Samuelson suggest,
this observation plus the assumption of selfish preferences seems sufficient
to explain their one shot laboratory play.
The other possibility is that the subjects do not import strategies or
patterns of behavior from the target repeated real life game into the one-
shot laboratory game. Assume, for the sake of argument, that this shows
that purely selfish preferences are not sufficient to explain their cooperative
behavior in the laboratory and that “something else” is involved. As we
have seen, it does not follow that this “something else” necessarily has
the kind of consistency and stability that warrants talk of social prefer-
ences, but let us put this consideration aside and agree that social pref-
654 JAMES WOODWARD
erences of some form figure in the explanation of the laboratory behavior.
The following question then arises: What is the relationship between these
social preferences that are present in the laboratory and whatever pref-
erences are operative in the real life repeated game? Can (hypothesis 1)
the same social preferences that are measured in the laboratory also be
the preferences that explain cooperative behavior in the real life repeated
game, even though it is also true (hypothesis 2) that it is unwarranted to
think that subjects import norms, strategies, and patterns of behavior
from the real life repeated game into the lab? It is not obvious that this
combination of hypotheses is plausible or even coherent. Prima facie, one
would think that if the laboratory experiment successfully measures or
detects preferences that are at work in explaining cooperation in real life
repeated interaction, this can only be because subjects in the laboratory
do import those preferences into the laboratory game, where it also guides
their behavior. That is, the cost of accepting hypothesis 2 seems to be
that the external validity of the inference from behavior in the laboratory
and the preferences detected on the basis of that behavior is undermined.
Put somewhat differently, the problem is that the proponent of using
one-shot games to measure and detect social preferences seems to have
two different methodological goals that are difficult to satisfy simulta-
neously. On the one hand, the proponent wants to use cooperative be-
havior in one-shot games to show that subjects have nonselfish prefer-
ences; on the assumption that play in repeated games can be explained
just by appeal to selfish preferences, this requires that play in one-shot
games not simply reflect what happens in some associated repeated game.
On the other hand, the object of the laboratory investigation is to uncover
preferences that are at work in explaining behavior in real life repeated
interactions, and this seems to require some nontrivial similarity between
the two contexts.
Another way of putting the dilemma is in terms of the robustness of
the behavior and preferences that are exhibited in the one-shot laboratory
game. A crucial question to ask is whether these are robust under repe-
tition of the game. Evidence of the sort provided by Fehr and Fischbacher
seems to suggest that, at least in some cases, behavior exhibited in one-
shot games is not robust under repetition and that subjects are influenced
by considerations having to do with reputation and learning in repeated
games that are not at work in one-shot games. But to the extent that this
is true, behavior in the one-shot laboratory game (and whatever we are
able to infer about the preferences or motivations that sustain that be-
havior) seems likely to tell us less than we would like about behavior in
the repeated game or the preferences that underlie such behavior. How-
ever, if the behavior detected in the one-shot game is robust under rep-
etition, and if it is also true that the behavior found in the repeated game
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can be explained just in terms of selfish preferences,then it is not clear
how results from the one-shot game by themselves could be evidence for
nonselfish preferences.
I said above that the cogency of the Binmore-Samuelson critique is
largely independent of the truth of the frequency claim and that the cri-
tique stands even if that claim is rejected. We now should be able to see
why this is true. The dilemma described above will be applicable whenever
a researcher claims to use a one-shot laboratory experiment to detect
social preferences that are also claimed to explain cooperation in a real
life repeated game. Whether or not one-shot cooperative interactions are
common either in our society or others, it is uncontroversial that many
real life interactions in which cooperation occurs are repeated interactions.
It would be an enormous and unsatisfactory restriction on the scope of
a theory of social preferences if it did not apply to real life cases of
cooperation involving repeated interactions. For example, the social pref-
erences (or whatever) that are detected in the laboratory PG game should
also be such that they or similar preferences figure in real life patterns of
repeated cooperation such as the harambee. Moreover, issues about ro-
bustness remain even if we restrict attention to inferences from one-shot
laboratory games to real life interactions that are one-shot in the sense
of not being repeated with the same partner. As we have noted, a fairly
generic result from laboratory experimentation is that prosocial behavior
declines under repetition of one-shot games. To the extent that many one-
shot interactions are repeated with different partners in real life (the same
person tips one time in each of many different restaurants on a trip), why
does not prosocial behavior in such interactions erode under repetition?
It looks as though whatever it is that is responsible for patterns of con-
tinued cooperation in real life one-shot interactions (never mind coop-
eration in repeated interactions) cannot be determined just from labo-
ratory games in which play occurs only once.
I emphasize that the argument that I have given does not show either
that people do not have social preferences or that they do not exhibit
genuinely prosocial behavior. Nor would it be correct to conclude that
behavior in one-shot games does not provide information of any kind
about behavior in real life repeated interactions. Rather, what my argu-
ment (if successful) shows is twofold.
First, it suggests that a certain class of arguments for the existence of
social preferences that are operative in real life repeated interactions is
problematic, namely, arguments based on behavior in one-shot laboratory
games that are thought to be analogues or instances of the repeated real
life interaction. This is entirely consistent with there being other more
convincing evidence for the existence of some form of social preferences
or at least prosocial behavior. In fact, I think that there is such evidence—
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it is based in part on experimental results from repeated games, such as
restart and endogenous grouping effects (in which allowing cooperators
to associate together boosts contributions) in repeated PG games. These
avoid the problematic inference from behavior in one-shot games to be-
havior in repeated games that I have been criticizing .
As I read this literature, it supports a picture according to which typical
subject populations are mixtures of different types, some substantial por-
tion of whom are purely selfish and another substantial portion of whom
are conditional cooperators, who will cooperate with others who have
cooperated (or whom they expect will cooperate) even when this is not
the pay-off maximizing choice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that they
are conditional cooperators, the behavior of this group appears to be very
sensitive to their beliefs/expectations about how others with whom they
are interacting will (or have behave[d]), to their beliefs about others’ beliefs
and expectations regarding their behavior, to the intentions they believe
others to have, to the costs of cooperation, to perceived entitlements, and
to other factors as well. This context dependence perhaps explains why
it has proved so hard to write down simple utility functions characterizing
subject’s social preferences that allow for precise quantitative predictions
of behavior across contexts, including from the laboratory to the field. It
also fits with the observation that social norms play a large role in co-
ordinating cooperative activity and that experiments of the sort discussed
above often seem to be more plausibly construed as measurements of such
norms rather than individual-level social preferences. (cf. Bicchieri 2006).
Second, the argument I have given certainly does not undercut the
reality of the differences in patterns of play in UG, PG, and other games
across different cultures reported in Henrich et al. 2006. It remains a
sensible project to ask whether those differences correlate with differences
in cooperative behavior in real life interactions in those societies—for
example, are societies whose members behave more cooperatively in PG
games also more likely to contain successful institutions that provide
public goods? However, if the argument I have given is correct, finding
such a correlation does not by itself tell us why such subjects cooperate,
either in the lab or in real life. That is, for all that the existence of the
correlation shows, both instances of cooperation may be sustained by
purely selfish preferences or they may be sustained in some other way.
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